UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

11-23-2009

Climax v. Snake River Oncology Appellant's Brief
Dckt. 36613

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Climax v. Snake River Oncology Appellant's Brief Dckt. 36613" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 85.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/85

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

*****
CLIMAX, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, Plaintiff-Appellant,

SNAKE RIVER ONCOLOGY OF EASTERN IDAHO, PLLC, and CI3RISTIAN SHULL, M.D.,
Defendants-Respondents,

Supreme Court Docket No. 36613

*****
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

*****
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, presiding.

*****
B. J. Driscoll, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant Climax, LLC.
Don Carey, Esq., and Jeremy Brown, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Respondents,
Snake River Oncology of Eastern Idaho, PLLC, and Christian Shull, M.D.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 2007, the defendants-respondents, Snake River Oncology of Eastern Idaho, PLLC
("SRO) and Christian Shull, M.D. ("Shull"), terminated a commercial lease with the plaintiffappellant, Climax, LLC ("Climax"), in reliance on the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act ("SCRA"),
50 U.S.C. App. 5 501, et seq. The SCRA permits servicemembers to terminate leases under certain
circumstances when called to active duty. However, in balancing the special privileges to
servicemembers against the legitimate rights of creditors, Section 535(g) of the SCRA specifically
grants lessors the right to seek modification of a servicemember's lease termination "as justice and
equity require." Here, Climax petitioned for relief, but the trial court denied Climax' petition on the
grounds that Climax failed to prove fraud. Because nothing in Section 535(g), its legislative history,
or in the cases that apply it requires that a lessor show fraud in order to obtain relief from a
servicemember's lease termination, Climax now appeals the trial court's decision. The plain
language of Section 535(g) authorizes relief as justice and equity require, nothing more
As explained more fully below, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment to SRO and Shull and remand with instructions for the trial court to determine whether
justice and equity require modification of Shull and SRO's lease termination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 18,2004, SRO signed a lease agreement ("Lease") with Climax for a fiveyear term.' At that same time, Shull signed a personal guaranty of SRO's obligations under the

' Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008
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Lease.' Shull negotiated the terms of the Lease with David Collette ("Collette") of ~ l i i n a x . ~
Because Collette and Shull lcnew each other before signing the lease, Collette agreed that Climax
would initially defer a portion of the rent payments from SRO "to make it easier" for Shull to lease
the property ''knowing that [Shull] was just starting @is] practice."4 CoIlette did not request
anything additional in the Lease in exchange for the reduced initial rent payments.5
At all times relevant to this action, Shull is a licensed physician and a member of the United
States Army ~ e s e r v e s .Sometime
~
before October 2006, Shull received a telephone call from the
United States Army notifying him that he would probably be called up to active duty.' In late
January 2007, Shull received written orders for him to report to active duty in Fort Irwin, California
in late February 2007.~
On February 23,2007, the day before Shull left Idaho Falls to report to active duty,' he
signed a contract to purchase a building approximately double the size of the building he was
leasing from Climax" for a purchase price of $1,849,497.95" and to purchase equipment and
supplies for an additional $300,000,'~resulting in a totalpurchase of over $2.1 million the day
before he left for active duty. Shull purchased the building, equipment, and supplies from Dr.

Kevin Mulvey, another oncologist in the Idaho Falls area. Shull made the purchase "primarily" to
Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008
R Vol. I, pp. 41-42.
R V01. I, pp. 41-42.
RVol. I, pp. 41-42.
R Vol. I, p. 29.
7
R Vol. I, pp. 30-31.
RVo1. I, p p 31-32.
R Vol. I, p. 32.
'OR Vol. I, p. 45.

'
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prevent another oncologist from coming to the Idaho Falls market after Dr. Mulvey retired.I3 By
purchasing the building, equipment, and supplies, Shull's monthly debt obligation went from
between $7,000 to $8,000 per month for the remaining two and one-half years on the Climax leaseI4
to $18,000 per month for 20 years on a loan from Wells Fargo.15 Shull and Dr. Mulvey issued a
joint statement to hospital staff announcing Dr. Mulvey's retirement and Shull's accepting the
responsibility for the care of Dr. Mulvey's patients.'6
During his period of active duty service in California from February 24 to approximately
May 27,2007, Shull provided Climax with written notice under 50 U.S.C. App. 5 535 &at he was
terminating the Lease with Climax effective May 30, 2007.17 Shull returned to Idaho Falls from his
active duty service before Memorial Day (May 28, 2007).18 Thus, Shull was back in Idaho Falls
before the lease termination became effective on May 30, 2007.19 SRO and Shull vacated the

leased property on or about May 30,2007.
Shull knew he would probably serve only three months on active d u q Oand had successfully
hired a locum tenums physician to manage his practice during his absence." Shull did not become
interested in terminating his lease with Climax until after he became interested in purchasing the

" R Vol. I, pp. 46-47.
12

R Vol. I, p. 48.
R Val. I, p p 44-45.
l 4 R Vol. I, pp. 40-41.
R Vol. I, pp. 56-57.
16
Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit "E" to the Affidavit of B. .I.
Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
I' Clerk's Exhibits, p. 4 of Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008.
R Vol. I, p. 33.
19
Clerk's Exhibits, pp. 4-5 of Brief in Support oFMotion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008
20 R Vol. I, p. 53.
l3
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new building!'

At his deposition, Shull testified, "During our discussions of me purchasing the

building was when Ifirst thought of terminating the lease with ~1iina.x."~~
Shull contracted to
purchase the new building and equipment after receiving his orders and before he left for active duty
knowing that the purchase would increase his financial burden even as he was leaving for Fort

Shull admits that he was able to meet all of his financial obligations despite his call to active
d u g 5 and the only financial burden from his call to active duty was lost profits26from a reduced
number of new patient referrals.27 This reduced cash flow from Shull's absence lasted only three
months after his return and then the cash flow recovered.28 From January 2004 though November
2007 (which included Shull's three-month absence from March through May 2007), Shull and SRO
did not have to terminate or lay-off any employees for inability to pay them.29 Although ShulI
claims that his business cash flow was "severely compromised" by his absence, he admits that he
"can't quantify it."30 When asked if he had any idea of how much money he or SRO lost as a result

21

R Vol. 1, pp. 33-34 and p. 53.
R Vol. I, p. 45.
" R Vol. I, p. 45 (emphasis added).
24
R Vol. I, p. 53.
25 R Vo1. 1, p. 54. Clerk's Exhibits, p. 141,ll. 9-20 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian ShulI, M.D., Vol. 11,
taken July 11,2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit " Bto the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,
22

2008,
26
R Vol. I, p. 55.
27 Clerk's Exhibits, p. 143, 1. 12 thru p. 144, 1.4 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian Shull, M.D, Vol. 11, taken
July 11,2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
28
Clerk's Exhibits, p. 144,11. 16-25 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian Shull, M.D, Vol. 11, taken July 11,
2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
29
Clerk's Exhibits, p. 135,li. 18-24 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian Shull, M.D, Vol. 11, taken July 11,
2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit " B to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
30
Clerk's Exhibits, p. 142, 11. 1-23 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian Shull, M.D, Vol. 11, taken July 11,
2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit " B to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
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of his three-month deployment, Shull testified, "I d ~ n ' t . " ~When
'
asked whether SRO enjoyed a net
loss or net gain during his absence, Shull was unsure but testified, "I suspect that my company was
pro$table while I was gone."32 ShuIl's 2007 federal tax return reports a net profit of $804,843.00
for SRO in 2007 despite Shull's three-month military absence that year.33 Shull's 2007 federal tax
return reports Shull's adjusted gross income was $886,986.00 despite his three-month military
absence that year.34 Shull keeps $250,000 of his business revenues in an account for SRO's
operating expenses, and then takes the remaining revenue in a monthly draw.35
At his deposition, Shull testified that he was "primarily" interested in buying Dr. Mulvey's
building, equipment, and supplies "to prevent [Dr. Mulvey] froin selling it to somebody else"
because "[Shull] did not want [Dr. Mulvey] to bring another competitor into the Idaho Falls
market."36 Despite Shull's concern about Dr. Mulvey bringing another oncologist to the Idaho Falls
market, the May 11,2008 edition of the Post Register's Medical Guide included a promotional
advertisement from SRO announcing the addition of a new oncologist to SRO's staff. The
advertisement states, "Dr. Christian Shull and the staff of Snake River Oncology would like to
extend a warm welcome to Dr. Matthew ~ w e e t s e r . "The
~ ~ advertisement concludes, "Dr. Sweetser

"clerk's Exhibits, p. 152,ll. 4-7 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian Shull, M.D, Vol. TI, taken July 1I , 2008,
a copy of which is attached as Exhibit " B to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
32 Clerk's Exhibits, p. 156,l. 17 thru p. 157,l. 4 of the transcript of the deposition of Christian Sbull, M.D, Vol. 11, taken
July 11,2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit " B to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
33 Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit " D to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
34 Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit " D to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
35 Clerk's Exhibits, p. 157,l. 23 thru p. 158, 1. 18 ofthe transcript of the deposition of Christian Shull, M.D, Vol. 11,
taken July 11,2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit " B to tbe Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008
36 R VOI.I, pp. 44-45.
37 Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
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is now accepting new patients."38 The same advertisement from the May 11,2008 edition of the
Post Register's Medical Guide also appeared as a full-page advertisement in the July/August 2008
issue of Idaho Falls ~ a g a z i n e . ~ ~
As a result of SRO and Shull's termination of the Lease, Climax faced a total loss of
$323,964.36 through the remainder of the original lease term. However, Climax avoided
$249,648.36 of that loss by successfully reletting the property left vacant by SRO. By reletting the
property, Climax has reduced the amount of its potential losses from the lease termination from
$323,964.36 to actual losses of $74,316.00:~ AS part of its efforts to relet the property, Climax
incurred advertising expenses of $741.97:'

Climax' actual losses from the lease termination total

$75,057.97.~'
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On May 23,2007, Climax filed a complaint against SRO and ~ h u 1 1 .Subsequently,
~~
Climax
filed an amended complaint.44
On November 3,2008, after conducting discovery, Climax filed a motion for summary
judgment.45 Climax argued that there was no genuine issue of fact and that justice and equity
required the district court to modify SRO and Shull's lease termination for several reasons. First,
the SCRA, with its statutory history and case law. clearly vest courts with broad discretion to ensure
Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
Clerk's Exhibits, Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of B. J. Driscoll filed November 3,2008.
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Sue Landon filed November 3,2008.
4'Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Sue Landon filed November 3,2008.
42
Clerk's Exhibits, Affidavit of Sue Landon filed November 3,2008.
43
R Vol. I, p. 9.
44 R Vo1. I, p. 60.
38

39
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that servicemembers do not put the immunities and privileges of the SCRA to "unworthy use"
against the rights of their

creditor^.^^

This judicial discretion includes "broad latitude and discretion

in granting equitable remedies to lessors."47 The SCRA intends no unfair result. Second, the
undisputed facts demonstrated that Shull terminated his lease with Climax not because of
anticipated hardship or his inability to meet his obligations following his call to military service, but
to expand his medical practice and prevent competition from other oncologists by purchasing a
larger building and additional equipment.48 Third, Shull did not terminate the lease with Climax to
alleviate a financial burden from his military service. In fact, by terminating his lease and then
expanding his practice, Shull increased his debt from $240,000 under the lease to approximately
$4,300,000.~~
Fourth, Shull orchestrated the lease termination to be effective not before or during
his deployment, but a few days a$er his return from active duty." Fifth, despite his 3-month
military absence, Shull hired a locum tenurns physician to manage his practice during his absence.
As a result and despite his absence, Shull's practice profited. Shull's adjusted gross income that
year still reached nearly $900,000, plus the $250,000 that he keeps in SRO's business account.''

" See Clerk's

Certification of Exhibits (Sealed By Court Order) dated July 27,2009, already on file with the court.
Clerk's Exhibits, pp. 10-11 of Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008.
Clerk's Exhibits, p. 11 of Brief in Support of Motion for Sunux~aryJudgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3, 2008. (Emphasis original in brief, added from case quoted.)
48 Clerk's Exhibits, p. 12 of Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008.
49 Clerk's Exhibits, p. 13 of Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008.
Clerk's Exhibits, p. 13 of Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008.
" Clerk's Exhibits, p. 14 of Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Bench Trial filed
November 3,2008.
46

"
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In opposition to the motion, SRO and Shull argued that Climax improperly sought to require
the servicemember show an "undue hardship" before exercising the lease termination provisions of
the SCRA.'~ SRO and Shull argued that the lease termination provisions of the SCRA intentionally
omitted an "undue hardship" requirement to afford greater privileges to the servi~emembers.'~
Importantly, SRO and Shull offered only legal arguments and did not dispute any material factss4
In reply, Climax reiterated that SRO and Shull did not dispute the facts of the case and
summary judgment was proper.55 Climax responded to SRO and Shull's legal argument by pointing
to the express language of Section 535(g) granting the court the right to modify Shull's lease
termination "as justice and equity require."" Climax also distinguished Conroy v. AniskofJ; 507
U.S. 51 1 (1993), the legal authority SRO and Shull had relied on. The SCRA provision at issue in
Conroy was Section 525 of the SCRA, which extended the time. for a servicemember to exercise a

right of redemption in real property. The defendants in Conroy argued that the servicemember
should be required to show a hardship (an express prerequisite found in other provisions of the
SCRA, but not in Section 525) before enjoying the extended redemption period. The United States
Supreme Court rejected the defendants' argument, refusing to read a hardship requirement into
Section 525 that did not exist. Climax explained that Section 525 at issue in Conroy did not include
an exception to the servicemember's rights, but Section 535 did in subsection (g). Specifically,
Section 535(g) expressly granted lessors the right to challenge a servicemember's lease termination

Clerk's Exhibits, p. 1 of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 17,2008.
Clerk's Exhibits, pp. 2-7 of Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 17,2008.
54 Clerk's Exhibits, Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 17,2008.
55 Clerk's Exhibits, p p 1-2 of Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 21,2008.
56 Clerk's Exhibits, pp. 2-5 of Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 21,2008.
52

53
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and for a court to modify that termination "as justice and equity require."j7 Climax also reminded
the court of its successful mitigation efforts, having avoided over 77% of the $323,964.36 in total
losses resulting from the lease terminati~n.~'
At the December 1,2008 hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Climax reiterated its
request for relief as follows:

23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

17
If I understand the defendants' argument
correctly, he's saying that undue hardship is not a
proper consideration for the court in this case. I
18
think that's entirely incorrect. The standard is -and we're not disputing it, and they don't dispute
it -- does justice and equity require there be some
modification? In other words, is iffair for my
client to have to bear that whole burden or not? And
I understand that. There is no legal entitlement to
any particular amount. There's no magical formula for
how to determine this. This is an equitable case.
The legislative history and the case law
history is clear. The court has broad discretion.
And that's clear. What we're asking the court to
do -- and the case law supports this. And that is
consider undue hardship as a factor when loolting at
the justice and equity of the situation. It's nothing
more than that. It's nothing less than that. We
think in this case it's proper, and given the history
that it is a proper consideration. Again, they're
trying to balance the rights of the soldier against
the rights of his creditor. And an undue hardship to
the soldier is a proper consideration.j9

57

Clerk's Exhibits, pp. 2-5 of Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed November 21,2008.
Clerk's Exhibits, pp. 5-6 of Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgme~itfiled November 21,2008.
59 See Tr Vol. I, p. 17,l. 23 through p. 18,l. 20 (emphasis added).
58
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Climax further explained that this case was not an attack on Shull, but a simple question of
whether Climax should bear the entire burden from the lease termination so that Shull could expand
his business as follows:

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
1
2
3
4
5

19
Dr. Shull, to his credit, made almost $900,000 in the
2007 year. Good for him. He had an additional
$250,000 tucked away in his business account in Snake
River Oncology. That's great. It sounds like he's
running a great business. And we're not criticizing
him as a business manager. What we are criticizing
himfor is placing the burden of carrying the loss
from his lease termination on us, when he's entirely
20
capable of carrying itfor himseIJ: He could have
honored this lease. He's using the statute in a way
that was not intended, to try to avoid his just
liabilities. And that's what we think is notjust and
that we think is not equitable.

....
21
Dr. Shull was able to buy a new building, buy
additional equipment, expand his practice. And we
don't fault him for that. Again, this is not an
attack on Dr. Shull. He's not a bad guy. He's not a
bad doctor. We're not saying any of that. All we're
saying is that we need to look at whether justice and
equity would have my clientfoot the billfor his
22
I business expansion, and we think that that's clearly
2 not the case.60

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

On January 30,2009, the court filed its Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment ("Order") denying Climax' motion for summary judgment and granting

" See Tr Vol.

1, p. 19,l. 18 through p. 20,l. 5 and p. 21,l. 19 through p. 22,l. 2 (emphasis added).
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summary judgment sua sponte to SRO and ~hu11.~'
The court erroneously referred to Climax' claim
as one for breach of contract?' The court correctly noted that Section 535 does not include a
provision requiring the servicemember to show hardship or prejudice to terminate a lease.63
However, the court seemed to limit the available equitable relief to instances of "'mutual mistake,
fraud, or impossibility."'64 The court then denied any relief to Climax because "[tlhere are no
allegations before the court of fraud, or that Shull entered the military in order to shirk his

obligation^."^^ In reaching its conclusion, the court did not cite to any facts supporting the "justice"
or "equity" of its decision, but stated, "Plaintiff has not presented a compelling argument for this
court to exercise its equitable discretion and withhold the protectioil of the
After granting summary judgment to SRO and Shull, the court entered a Final Judgment on
May 1 5 , 2 0 0 9 . ~Subsequent
~
to entry of judgment, the distxict court determined that this matter
involved a commercial transaction and awarded SRO and Shull attorney's fees and costs pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e).68
On June 9, 2008, Climax timely filed its Notice of
/I

" R Vol.

p.

I; 118 (quoting Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443,447 (1993).
R VOI.I, p. 118.
"R Vol. I, p. 119.
b7 R Vo1. I, p. 7. In preparing its appellate brief, Climax noted that the clerk's record did not include the Final Judgment.
However, Climax understands that there is no dispute as lo the date or content ofthe Final Judgment, and that the Final
Judgment is not a pleading critical to the resolution of this appeal, and therefore does not seek to augment the record to
include the Final Judgment.
R Vol. I, p. 135.
b9 R Vol. 1, p. 126.
b5

'*
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the district court commit reversible error by requiring Climax to show Shull

committed fraud before granting Climax any relief under Section 535(g) of the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act?
2.

Is Climax entitled to an award of its attorney's fees and costs on appeal under Idaho

Code Section 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41?
ARGUMENT
1.
:IHE DISSrK!C?'COUI<.I: cO\lhll:ITf<D REVERSIBI~EEl<I<ORBY IUiOUIIUNC; CCCL.I\li~~.'I'Q
SHO\ljSIII!LLCOhlhll?"lEL)
.
1:RAU.U BEFORE (iK.L\N?'INC; CI.Ih'fAX liOUI'l'ABL_1: KELIk'F.
A.

Standard Of Review.
If there are "no disputed issues of material fact," then this Court "exercise[s] free review

over all remaining questions of law." Adarns v. Anderson, 142 Idaho 208,210 (2005); see also

Cristo Viene Pentecoslal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,307 (2007). "The interpretation and
application of a statute are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.

Roeder Holdings, L.L. C. v. Bd. of Equalization ofAda County, 136 Idaho 809,812 (2001),
abrogated on other grounds by Ada County Bd. ofEqualization v. Highlands, Inc., 141 Idaho 202,
108 P.3d 349 (2005)." Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, --- (2009).
In the present case, there are no disputed issues of fact. The only issue on appeal is a
question of law. As such, the standard of review is free review.
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B.

The Trial Court Erroneously Imposed A Fraud Standard In Section 5 3 5 ( ~ Where
)
None

Exists.
In its Order, the trial court correctly recited Section 535(g) of the SCRA that the co.urt could
modif) Shull's lease termination "as justice and equity require."70 Then, without providing any
authority, the trial court erroneously imposed a much higher standard for relief, namely that Climax
show Shull committed fraud. The trial court never discussed justice or equity. Rather, relying on an
Idaho case involving a fire damage claim entirely unrelated to the SCRA, the trial court limited
Section 535(g)'s concept of "equity" to cases of "'mutual mistake, fraud, or impossibility."'7' For

-

the reasons set forth below, this Court should now correct the error.
1.

The plain language of Section 535(9) does not require a showing of fraud for a lessor
to receive relief.

As this Court explains, "When interpreting a statute, the Court begins with the plain
language. '[Ilf the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the Court need merely apply the
statute without engaging in any statutory construction.... Statutory interpretation begins with the
words of the statute, giving the language its plain, obvious and rational meanings."' Pocatello v

State, 145 Idaho 497, 501 (2008) (quotation omitted).
The plain language of Section 535(g) states, "Upon application by the lessor to a court
before the termination date provided in the written notice, relief granted by this section to a
servicemember may be modified asjustice and equity require." 50 U.S.C. App. $ 535(g)
(emphasis added). The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. "Justice" may be defined

7'

R Vo1. I, p. 114.
R Vol. I, p. 118 (quoting Ilolscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443,447 (1993)
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as "the constant and perpetual disposition o f legal matters or disputes to render every man his due."
864 (6th ed. 1990). "Equity" may be defined as "filustice administered
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules o f common law. . . The term
'equity' denotes the spirit and habit o f fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the
540 (6th ed. 1990). Importantly, Section
intercourse o f men with men." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
535(g) makes no mention o f fraud, impossibility, or mutual mistake, or any other partjcular
equitable theory as a prerequisite for a lessor to obtain relief. In the common vernacular, Section
535(g) provides that a court can modify a servicemember's lease termination "to make it fair."
Here, the trial court erred by ignoring the plain language o f the statute and instead reading a
fraud requirement into Section 535(g) where none exists. Nothing in the statute requires the court to
consider anything other than "justice and equity," i.e., what is just and fair.
2.

The case law interpreting Section 535(g) does not require a showing o f fraud in order
for a lessor to receive equitable relief.

Research produced only two reported case involving Section 535(g) or its predecessors,
namely Omega Industries, Inc. v. RaSfaele, 894 F.Supp. 1425 (D.Nev. 1995), and Patrikes v. J C H
Service Stations, 180 Misc. 917,41 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y.City Ct.1943).
The Omega case never discusses fraud or any other particular equitable theory a lessor must
prove to obtain relief under Section 535(g). In a thorough and thoughtful opinion, the Omega court
discussed the statutory language, legislative history, and case law o f the SCRA in reviewing the
predecessor to Section 535(g) as follows:
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Turning first to the statutory language, subsection 304(2) [now Section 535(g)72]
allows military personnel to terminate their leasehold agreements which exist at the time
they enter the service. Subsection 304(2) also provides that military personnel may
receive a refund of any unpaid rent or security deposit. See Patrikes v. JC.H Service
Stations, 180 Misc. 917,41 N.Y.S.2d 158 (N.Y.City (3.1943). However, the statutory
language provides that this leasehold relief "shall be subject to such modifications or
restrictions as in the opinion of the court iustice and eauitv
- may in the circumstances
require." This language provides the court with broad latitude in granting equitable
remedies. Thus, if termination of a lease pursuant to subsection 304(2)
. . causes damages
in excess of a military person's monthly rental obligations and security deposit, the c&
may, if equity andjustice require, grant an equitable remedy thatfully compensates a
lessorfor those damages. For example, if a military person-who knows that he or she
will soon be invoking subsection 304(2) to terminate an existing lease-wrongfully
induces a lessor to make tenant improvements, a court may find that equity requires that
an equitable remedy be granted in an amount equal to both the cost of those
improvements and the monthly rental obligations of that military person. The court
finds no language in subsection 304(2) which would limit its authority to grant such an
equitable remedy.
The legislative history accompanying the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
also reveals that Congress did not intend to limit the court's authority to award an
equitable remedy under subsection 304(2). This history reveals that "'the very heart
of the policy of the Act' was to provide ijudicial discretion ... instead of rigid and
uizdiscrimiizatingsuspension of civilproceedings. "'Conroy v. Aniskofl507 U.S. 5 11,
----,113 S.Ct. 1562, 1568, 123 L.Ed.2d 229 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed,
when Congress initially enacted the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act at the end of
the First World War FN4,it stated that courts were to be given full discretion to ensure
that the Act would be applied in accordance with the principles of equity.
FN4. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Act of 1940 is
substantially identical to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Act of
1918 (40 Stat. 440). Therefore, the legislative intent
history of the 1918 Act may be examined to determine
the intent of the 1940 Act. Boone v. Lightner, 3 19 U.S.
561,565,63 S.Ct. 1223, 1226,87 L.Ed. 1587 (1943).
"Instead of the bill we are now considering being arbitrary,
inelastic, inflexible, the discretion as to dealing out even-handedjustice
between the creditor and the soldier, taking into consideration the fact
Section 304(2) is the predecessor to Section 535(g). Omega quotes Section 304(2), which reveals no substantive
difference with Section 535(g).

72
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that the soldier has been called to his country's cause, rests largely, and
in some cases, in the breast of the judge who tries the case."

Convoy, 507 U.S. at ----,113 S.Ct. at 1568, quoting 55 Cong.Rec. 7787
(1917) (statement of Rep. Webb, Chairman of House Judiciary
Committee).
The plain language of subsection 304(2) and its accompanying legislative
history clearly indicate that courts have broad latitude and discretion in granting
equitable remedies to lessors.

Id. at 1430-1431 (emphasis added).
The Omega opinion makes several principles clear. Courts have "broad latitude in granting
equitable remedies," including the discretion to grant relief "that fully compensates a lessor." This
discretion is '"the very heart of the policy of the Act"' so that the Act "would be applied in
accordance with the principles of equity." The objective of the Act is to "deal[] out even-handed
justice between the creditor and the soldier, taking into consideration the fact that the solder has
been called to his country's cause." The Omega court correctly noted the primary purpose of the
SCRA is to help those called to serve our country. However, if the facts of the case show the
servicemember acted "wrongfully," i.e., unjustly or inequitably, then the c o w has discretion and
authority to grant relief against the servicemember.
Like Omega, the Patrikes case never discusses fraud or any other particular equitable theory a
lessor must prove to obtain relief under Section 535(g). The Patrikes court instructs, "[Tlhe court
should give heed to the particular evil which the statute sought to remedy. The presumption [in
interpreting the SCRA] is always that no unjust or unreasonable result was intended. . ." Id., 41
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N.Y.S.2d at 164 (emphasis added). In reviewing the legislative history and purpose of the SCRA, the

Patrikes court elaborated as follows:

. . . [I]t is readily ascertained that the primary desire of Congress is to give
protection to the soldier first (Secs. 100,201,204, 302), and to his dependents next
(Secs. 303,306), to prevent or remedy any undue hardship resulting to them, and
this accentuates the aim of Congress. The object is to relieve the soldier from the
consequences of his handicap in meeting financial and other obligations incurred
prior to his call to duty, so that his energies may be devoted to his military duties,
unhampered by mental distress occasioned by the consequences to him or to his
dependents flowing from his inability to meet his obligations. . . . . [Tlhough they
are remedial in character, they may not be invoked for any 'needless or
unwarrantedpurpose', but must be administered to accomplish substantial justice.
41 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
Neither the court nor Shull produced any authority that Climax must prove fraud in order to
obtain equitable relief under Section 535(g). Rather, judicial discretion to deal out justice and
fairness is paramount. The trial court erred by applying a fraud standard.
3.

Related cases aaplvina the SCRA do not reauire a showing of fraud for a aartv to
receive relief against a servicemember.

Although not directly discussing Section 535(g), several other cases involving the SCRA help to
illustrate the overall purpose and intent of the Act. The United States Supreme Court notes the SCRA's
principal intent to protect those that serve our country, but nevertheless explains that this intent is
tempered by principle of justice and equity, granting courts discretion "tosee that the immunities of the

Act [i.e., the Act as a whole, as opposed to just one specific subsection] are notput to such unworthy
use." Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 574 (1943) (emphasis and bracketed portions added). The
Court explained how the post-Civil War amendments to legislation like the SCRA sought to provide
more balance between the protections to the soldier and the rights of creditors as follows:
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Accompanying 'Notes as to the Provisions of the Bill' stated that a 'sweeping
exemption' such as that provided by most States in Civil War days, was 'too broad, for
there are many cases where the financial ability of soldiers and sailors to meet
obligations in some way is not materially impaired by their entrance into service.'
Hearings and Memoranda before Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 2859 and H.R. 6361,
65th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., p. 27.
Major John H. Wigmore, one of the drafters of the bill, stated at the Senate
hearings, that 'a universal stay against soldiers is wasteful, because hundreds of them
are men of affairs and men of assets, and they have agents back here looking after
their affairs. There is no earthly reason why the court proceedings should stay against
them. It is the small man, or perhaps Ishould say the humble man, who has just
himselfand no agent and no outside assets, that we do not want toforget. He is the
man we are thinking o j These otherpeople can take care of themselves,and the court
would say to them, 'No; your affair is a going concern; go ahead with the lawsuit, You
have a lawyer, you have an agent, you have a corporation manager, and other things.'

....
There are many men now in the Army who can and shouldpay their obligations in
full.
Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 569 n.2 (1943) (emphasis added).
Another court emphasized that the SCRA "may not be employed as a means of enabling one
who hasflouted his obligations in civilian life to obtain indefinite delay or to cancel his just liabilities."

Franklin Soc. for Home-Building and Savings v. Flavin, 265 A.D. 720, 721 (NY 1943) (emphasis
added). An earlier case explained the principle in similar fashion as follows:
While the courts will protect men engaged in the service of the nation from
loss in legal proceedings brought about by their absence in service, the papers should
show that the threatened injury is due to their sewice and consequent inability to
protect their interests, and this is the plain direction of the act of Congress.

Dietz v. Treupel, 184 A.D. 448,448-450 (NY 1918) (emphasis added).
In general, the SCRA does not require a showing of fraud to limit the relief granted to
servicemembers. In particular, Section 535(g) does not require a lessor prove fraud in order to
obtain relief from the servicemember's lease termination, particularly in cases involving "men of
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affairs and Inen of assets . . . . who can and should pay their obligations in full." Boone, supra, 3 19
U.S. at 569 n.2. The trial couft erred in requiring Climax prove more than the law requires
4.

This Court should remand this case with instructions for the trial court to consider
the justice. eauitv, and fairness of Shull's lease termination based on the undisputed
facts.
-

Clearly, the trial court erred by applying a fraud standard to Section 535(g) where none
exists. To remedy this error, this Court should remand the case with instructions for the trial court
to apply the correct legal standard to the undisputed facts of the case. The correct standard is taken
&om the plain language of Section 535(g) itself, namely whether "justice and equity require"
modification of Shull's lease termination. In other words, the trial court should loolc at the
undisputed facts to determine whether it is fair for Climax to bear the full $75,057.97 cost of Shull's
lease termination so that Shull can expand his business and where SRO has $250,000 sitting in the
bank and Shull earned $886,986.00 that year despite his 3-month military absence.
Some equity cases require proof of fraud. This case does not. Sometimes the duty to do
equity just means the duty to do what is fair. This is what Section 535(g) calls for. This is what
Climax petitions for. This is what the Court should instruct the trial court to do.
11.
THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD CLIMAX ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney's fees in actions arising from a
commercial transaction both at the trial level and on appeal. I.C. § 12-120(3); Esser Elec. v. Lost

River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 912,921 (2008); I.A.R. 41. Idaho Appellate Rule 40
allows at award of costs "as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise provided by
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law or order of the Court." I.A.R. 40(a). The lrial court already determined the prevailing party is
entitled to recover attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). Neither party appealed
this decision. As such, the Court should award Climax its attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting
summEuy judgment to Shull and SRO and remand this case with instructions for the district court to
determine whether justice and equity require modification of Shull and SRO's lease termination
given the undisputed facts of the case. This Court should also award Climax its costs and attorney's
fees in this regard.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this

2day of November, 2009.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By:
Y

Attorneys for Appellant, Climax, LLC
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